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  • /* Copyright 2016 OpenMarket Ltd
     *
     * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
     * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
     * You may obtain a copy of the License at
     *
     *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
     *
     * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
     * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
     * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
     * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
     * limitations under the License.
     */
    
    #include "olm/inbound_group_session.h"
    
    #include <string.h>
    
    #include "olm/base64.h"
    #include "olm/cipher.h"
    
    #include "olm/crypto.h"
    
    #include "olm/error.h"
    #include "olm/megolm.h"
    
    #include "olm/memory.h"
    
    #include "olm/message.h"
    
    #include "olm/pickle.h"
    #include "olm/pickle_encoding.h"
    
    
    
    #define OLM_PROTOCOL_VERSION     3
    
    #define PICKLE_VERSION           1
    
    #define SESSION_KEY_VERSION      2
    
    
    struct OlmInboundGroupSession {
        /** our earliest known ratchet value */
        Megolm initial_ratchet;
    
        /** The most recent ratchet value */
        Megolm latest_ratchet;
    
    
        /** The ed25519 signing key */
        struct _olm_ed25519_public_key signing_key;
    
    
        enum OlmErrorCode last_error;
    };
    
    size_t olm_inbound_group_session_size() {
        return sizeof(OlmInboundGroupSession);
    }
    
    OlmInboundGroupSession * olm_inbound_group_session(
        void *memory
    ) {
        OlmInboundGroupSession *session = memory;
        olm_clear_inbound_group_session(session);
        return session;
    }
    
    const char *olm_inbound_group_session_last_error(
        const OlmInboundGroupSession *session
    ) {
        return _olm_error_to_string(session->last_error);
    }
    
    size_t olm_clear_inbound_group_session(
        OlmInboundGroupSession *session
    ) {
    
        _olm_unset(session, sizeof(OlmInboundGroupSession));
    
        return sizeof(OlmInboundGroupSession);
    }
    
    
    #define SESSION_KEY_RAW_LENGTH \
    
        (1 + 4 + MEGOLM_RATCHET_LENGTH + ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH\
            + ED25519_SIGNATURE_LENGTH)
    
    
    /** init the session keys from the un-base64-ed session keys */
    static size_t _init_group_session_keys(
        OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
        const uint8_t *key_buf
    ) {
        const uint8_t *ptr = key_buf;
        size_t version = *ptr++;
    
        if (version != SESSION_KEY_VERSION) {
            session->last_error = OLM_BAD_SESSION_KEY;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
    
        uint32_t counter = 0;
    
        // Decode counter as a big endian 32-bit number.
        for (unsigned i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
            counter <<= 8; counter |= *ptr++;
        }
    
    
        megolm_init(&session->initial_ratchet, ptr, counter);
        megolm_init(&session->latest_ratchet, ptr, counter);
    
    
        ptr += MEGOLM_RATCHET_LENGTH;
        memcpy(
            session->signing_key.public_key, ptr, ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH
        );
        ptr += ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH;
    
    
        if (!_olm_crypto_ed25519_verify(
            &session->signing_key, key_buf, ptr - key_buf, ptr
        )) {
            session->last_error = OLM_BAD_SIGNATURE;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
    size_t olm_init_inbound_group_session(
        OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
        uint32_t message_index,
        const uint8_t * session_key, size_t session_key_length
    ) {
    
        uint8_t key_buf[SESSION_KEY_RAW_LENGTH];
    
        size_t raw_length = _olm_decode_base64_length(session_key_length);
    
        size_t result;
    
    
        if (raw_length == (size_t)-1) {
            session->last_error = OLM_INVALID_BASE64;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
    
        if (raw_length != SESSION_KEY_RAW_LENGTH) {
    
            session->last_error = OLM_BAD_SESSION_KEY;
    
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
        _olm_decode_base64(session_key, session_key_length, key_buf);
    
        result = _init_group_session_keys(session, key_buf);
    
        _olm_unset(key_buf, SESSION_KEY_RAW_LENGTH);
        return result;
    
    static size_t raw_pickle_length(
        const OlmInboundGroupSession *session
    ) {
        size_t length = 0;
        length += _olm_pickle_uint32_length(PICKLE_VERSION);
        length += megolm_pickle_length(&session->initial_ratchet);
        length += megolm_pickle_length(&session->latest_ratchet);
    
        length += _olm_pickle_ed25519_public_key_length(&session->signing_key);
    
        return length;
    }
    
    size_t olm_pickle_inbound_group_session_length(
        const OlmInboundGroupSession *session
    ) {
        return _olm_enc_output_length(raw_pickle_length(session));
    }
    
    size_t olm_pickle_inbound_group_session(
        OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
        void const * key, size_t key_length,
        void * pickled, size_t pickled_length
    ) {
        size_t raw_length = raw_pickle_length(session);
        uint8_t *pos;
    
        if (pickled_length < _olm_enc_output_length(raw_length)) {
            session->last_error = OLM_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
        pos = _olm_enc_output_pos(pickled, raw_length);
        pos = _olm_pickle_uint32(pos, PICKLE_VERSION);
        pos = megolm_pickle(&session->initial_ratchet, pos);
        pos = megolm_pickle(&session->latest_ratchet, pos);
    
        pos = _olm_pickle_ed25519_public_key(pos, &session->signing_key);
    
    
        return _olm_enc_output(key, key_length, pickled, raw_length);
    }
    
    size_t olm_unpickle_inbound_group_session(
        OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
        void const * key, size_t key_length,
        void * pickled, size_t pickled_length
    ) {
        const uint8_t *pos;
        const uint8_t *end;
        uint32_t pickle_version;
    
        size_t raw_length = _olm_enc_input(
            key, key_length, pickled, pickled_length, &(session->last_error)
        );
        if (raw_length == (size_t)-1) {
            return raw_length;
        }
    
        pos = pickled;
        end = pos + raw_length;
        pos = _olm_unpickle_uint32(pos, end, &pickle_version);
        if (pickle_version != PICKLE_VERSION) {
            session->last_error = OLM_UNKNOWN_PICKLE_VERSION;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
        pos = megolm_unpickle(&session->initial_ratchet, pos, end);
        pos = megolm_unpickle(&session->latest_ratchet, pos, end);
    
        pos = _olm_unpickle_ed25519_public_key(pos, end, &session->signing_key);
    
    
        if (end != pos) {
            /* We had the wrong number of bytes in the input. */
            session->last_error = OLM_CORRUPTED_PICKLE;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
        return pickled_length;
    }
    
    
    /**
     * get the max plaintext length in an un-base64-ed message
     */
    static size_t _decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
    
        OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
        uint8_t * message, size_t message_length
    ) {
        struct _OlmDecodeGroupMessageResults decoded_results;
    
        _olm_decode_group_message(
            message, message_length,
    
            megolm_cipher->ops->mac_length(megolm_cipher),
    
            ED25519_SIGNATURE_LENGTH,
    
            &decoded_results);
    
        if (decoded_results.version != OLM_PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
            session->last_error = OLM_BAD_MESSAGE_VERSION;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
        if (!decoded_results.ciphertext) {
            session->last_error = OLM_BAD_MESSAGE_FORMAT;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
    
        return megolm_cipher->ops->decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
            megolm_cipher, decoded_results.ciphertext_length);
    
    size_t olm_group_decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
        OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
        uint8_t * message, size_t message_length
    ) {
        size_t raw_length;
    
        raw_length = _olm_decode_base64(message, message_length, message);
        if (raw_length == (size_t)-1) {
            session->last_error = OLM_INVALID_BASE64;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
        return _decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
            session, message, raw_length
        );
    }
    
    /**
     * decrypt an un-base64-ed message
     */
    static size_t _decrypt(
    
        OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
        uint8_t * message, size_t message_length,
        uint8_t * plaintext, size_t max_plaintext_length
    ) {
        struct _OlmDecodeGroupMessageResults decoded_results;
    
        Megolm *megolm;
        Megolm tmp_megolm;
    
        _olm_decode_group_message(
    
            message, message_length,
    
            megolm_cipher->ops->mac_length(megolm_cipher),
    
            ED25519_SIGNATURE_LENGTH,
    
            &decoded_results);
    
        if (decoded_results.version != OLM_PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
            session->last_error = OLM_BAD_MESSAGE_VERSION;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
    
        if (!decoded_results.has_message_index || !decoded_results.ciphertext) {
    
            session->last_error = OLM_BAD_MESSAGE_FORMAT;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
    
        /* verify the signature. We could do this before decoding the message, but
         * we allow for the possibility of future protocol versions which use a
         * different signing mechanism; we would rather throw "BAD_MESSAGE_VERSION"
         * than "BAD_SIGNATURE" in this case.
         */
        message_length -= ED25519_SIGNATURE_LENGTH;
        r = _olm_crypto_ed25519_verify(
            &session->signing_key,
            message, message_length,
            message + message_length
        );
        if (!r) {
            session->last_error = OLM_BAD_SIGNATURE;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
    
        max_length = megolm_cipher->ops->decrypt_max_plaintext_length(
            megolm_cipher,
    
            decoded_results.ciphertext_length
        );
        if (max_plaintext_length < max_length) {
            session->last_error = OLM_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
        /* pick a megolm instance to use. If we're at or beyond the latest ratchet
         * value, use that */
    
        if ((decoded_results.message_index - session->latest_ratchet.counter) < (1U << 31)) {
    
            megolm = &session->latest_ratchet;
    
        } else if ((decoded_results.message_index - session->initial_ratchet.counter) >= (1U << 31)) {
    
            /* the counter is before our intial ratchet - we can't decode this. */
    
            session->last_error = OLM_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX;
    
            return (size_t)-1;
        } else {
            /* otherwise, start from the initial megolm. Take a copy so that we
             * don't overwrite the initial megolm */
            tmp_megolm = session->initial_ratchet;
            megolm = &tmp_megolm;
        }
    
    
        megolm_advance_to(megolm, decoded_results.message_index);
    
    
        /* now try checking the mac, and decrypting */
    
        r = megolm_cipher->ops->decrypt(
            megolm_cipher,
    
            megolm_get_data(megolm), MEGOLM_RATCHET_LENGTH,
    
            message, message_length,
    
            decoded_results.ciphertext, decoded_results.ciphertext_length,
            plaintext, max_plaintext_length
        );
    
    
        _olm_unset(&tmp_megolm, sizeof(tmp_megolm));
    
        if (r == (size_t)-1) {
            session->last_error = OLM_BAD_MESSAGE_MAC;
            return r;
        }
    
        return r;
    }
    
    
    size_t olm_group_decrypt(
        OlmInboundGroupSession *session,
        uint8_t * message, size_t message_length,
        uint8_t * plaintext, size_t max_plaintext_length
    ) {
        size_t raw_message_length;
    
        raw_message_length = _olm_decode_base64(message, message_length, message);
        if (raw_message_length == (size_t)-1) {
            session->last_error = OLM_INVALID_BASE64;
            return (size_t)-1;
        }
    
        return _decrypt(
            session, message, raw_message_length,
            plaintext, max_plaintext_length
        );
    }