* Initial commit for VoIP v1 implementation

* Added draft of event handlers for voip methods

* Added event handlers for VoIP events, added rejectCall, added version tracking for call version for V0 and V1 compatibility

* Added call events to the general message pipeline. Modified Call Reject mechanism

* Added message delegates for new events. Modified hidden events. Updated handle events.

* Updated implementation to keep track of calls on other devices

* Fixed linting

* Fixed code warnings

* Fixed minor bugs

* fixed ci

* Added acceptNegotiation method definition when missing gstreamer

* Fixed warnings

* Fixed linting

We can't have a pack that is neither sticker nor emoji. Which is why
none defaults to both on. That wasn't propagated to the UI, which made
the interaction very confusing. It also made some states unsettable,
since you can't turn anything off from the none state.

fixes #1152

This should reduce payload size a lot

The reply pagination logic is a bit weird rn though.

* cppcheck stuff

* Update src/ui/RoomSettings.cpp

Co-authored-by: DeepBlueV7.X <nicolas.werner@hotmail.de>

* Update src/ui/RoomSettings.cpp

Co-authored-by: DeepBlueV7.X <nicolas.werner@hotmail.de>

* Fix linting

Co-authored-by: DeepBlueV7.X <nicolas.werner@hotmail.de>

Causes error messages like:
error C3493: 'key_id' cannot be implicitly captured because no default capture mode has been specified

fixes #1203

Otherwise it conflicts with C++20 fmt.

Correctly verify that the reply to a secrets request is actually coming
from a verified device. While we did verify that it was us who replied,
we didn't properly cancel storing the secret if the sending device was
one of ours but was maliciously inserted by the homeserver and
unverified. We only send secret requests to verified devices in the
first place, so only the homeserver could abuse this issue.

Additionally we protected against malicious secret poisoning by
verifying that the secret is actually the reply to a request. This means
the server only has 2 places where it can poison the secrets:

- After a verification when we automatically request the secrets
- When the user manually hits the request button

It also needs to prevent other secret answers to reach the client first
since we ignore all replies after that one.

The impact of this might be quite severe. It could allow the server to
replace the cross-signing keys silently and while we might not trust
that key, we possibly could trust it in the future if we rely on the
stored secret. Similarly this could potentially be abused to make the
client trust a malicious online key backup.

If your deployment is not patched yet and you don't control your
homeserver, you can protect against this by simply not doing any
verifications of your own devices and not pressing the request button in
the settings menu.